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Wheeling Provisions of the Model Water Transfer Act
Timothy H. Quinn*
I.

Introduction

The 1990’s have been a period of great promise for ending decades of
policy gridlock in California's storied water wars. After years of conflict, the main
stakeholder groups, representing urban, agricultural, and environmental
interests, as well as key state and federal governmental agencies, have entered a
new era of cooperation. In December 1994, the historic Bay-Delta Accord forged
consensus regarding environmental protections for the San Francisco
Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta (Bay-Delta). That same month, the
"Monterey Agreement" ended years of disputes regarding the finances and water
allocations of the State Water Project. During 1996, an unprecedented
stakeholder coalition worked cooperatively to secure state and federal funding
for environmental restoration in the Bay-Delta watershed totaling more than
$1.4 billion.1 Building upon this foundation of consensus and cooperation,
California has a remarkable opportunity to resolve major environmental and
economic problems that have long plagued its water policies.
Developing effective and fair approaches to the voluntary transfer of water
among willing buyers and willing sellers remains one of the central challenges
to achieving the full policy potential of the 1990s. From the earliest days of

* Timothy H. Quinn is one of three Deputy General Managers responsible for overseeing
the activities of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (Metropolitan) which
delivers supplemental water to more than 16 million Southern Californians. His primary
responsibilities involve the development and implementation of external policies and
strategies to assure that Metropolitan receives reliable imported supplies in an economically
and environmentally sound manner. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of
California, Los Angeles. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Metropolitan or its member agencies.
1. The passage of California's Proposition 204 in November 1996 authorized almost
$1 billion for environmental restoration in the Bay Delta. See CAL. WATER CODE § 78684 (West
1996). Contingent on the passage of Proposition 204, Congress allocated another $430
million for the same purpose. See Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-333, 110 Stat. 4093 (1996).
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cooperative negotiations in the so-called "Three-Way Process,"2 it has been clear
that environmental interest groups and others concerned about the
implications of improving the state's water transportation infrastructure,
particularly in the Bay-Delta, could support such improvements only if strong
assurances were provided that improved water management practices would be
implemented statewide. Among these assurances is the implementation of
effective water markets so that future growth in the State's water demands can
be met in part by voluntary transfers of existing supplies, rather than solely
through the construction of costly and environmentally damaging new capital
projects to increase supplies.
Long regarded as theoretically attractive by academics, environmentalists,
business interests, and some urban water suppliers, water marketing has
evolved from theory to practical reality during the past decade. The recent staterun drought water banks, while significantly constraining market forces in favor
of governmental decisions regarding the allocation of water, nonetheless
provided ample evidence of the power of private market forces to help allocate
scarce water resources.3 Increasingly, in places such as the west side of the San
Joaquin Valley, where more and more stringent environmental regulations have
eroded traditional sources of supply, water users are relying on the market as a
long-term source of replacement supplies. In Southern California, an extensive
integrated resources planning process has identified water transfers as a key to
the region's long-term water supply reliability from both the Colorado River and
State Water Projects systems.4
While a vital element of long-term water policy, water marketing has
nonetheless been one of the most contentious issues in the California water
policy debate. Water marketing is the subject of fierce differences regarding the
proper role of state and federal governments and of water agencies. The issue
also raises concerns about impacts to the economy, to groundwater resources
of selling areas, and to the adverse financial impacts in both the selling and
buying regions. Against this backdrop of potential and pitfalls, the Model Water
Transfer Act (Model Act) emerges as one of the more important issues that may
confront the state legislature in its 1997 session. The Model Act proposes wide-

2. The "Three-Way Process" refers to a coalition of environmental, urban and
agricultural groups created in the late 1980s to work toward mutually beneficial solutions to
water resource allocation problems in California. The coalition, with its Principle for the ThreeWay Water Agreement Process, laid a major part of the groundwork for Governor Pete Wilson's
water policy statement in 1992. Letter from California Governor Pete Wilson to Metropolitan
Water District, Ending California's Water Wars (Apr. 6, 1992) (on file with West-Northwest).
3. For a review of California's 1991 Drought Water Bank, see CAL. DEP'T
RESOURCES, THE 1991 DROUGHT WATER BANK, (January 1992).

OF

WATER

4. For a review of integrated resources planning in Metropolitan's service area, see
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF S. CAL., SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA'S INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES
PLAN,. REPORT NO. 1107 (MARCH 1996) [hereinafter SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PLAN].
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ranging statutory changes designed to consolidate and simplify California's
existing labyrinth of law affecting water transfers.
This article provides a critical review of this ambitious and complex
legislative proposal, with a particular emphasis on the wheeling provisions of
the Model Act. Section II offers general observations on what will be required for
sustainable policy change to assure the continued evolution of water markets.
Section III defines some common sense principles for wheeling policies based
on the need for sustainable marketing policies. Section IV summarizes the
wheeling provisions of the Model Act, while Section V provides an assessment
of these provisions along with recommendations for some key changes. Section
VI offers concluding remarks and recommendations for changes in the wheeling
provisions of the Model Act.
Wheeling is one of the most important policy areas affecting the overall
success of efforts to promote effective voluntary marketing. In its current form,
the wheeling provisions of the Model Act fall considerably short of achieving
sound policy that will promote sustainable water markets in California. These
provisions could result in substantial negative water supply and financial
impacts on other water users who are not parties to a transaction. Accordingly,
the Model Act's provisions would likely add to the controversies plaguing
California water policy rather than resolve conflict. However, with appropriate
changes, the Model Act provides a framework through which the stakeholders,
legislators, and others can create a viable market as part of a successful
comprehensive water policy for California's future.
II.

Creating a Sustainable Water Market

To be sustainable and to create lasting benefits for the State's
environment and economy, any major policy change related to the
establishment of a voluntary water market must strive to generate a broad
distribution of gains and to avoid unnecessary negative impacts on stakeholders
not directly involved in market transactions. This common-sense principle
certainly applies to wheeling policies, which have the potential of greatly
facilitating market transactions, but could also result in enormous negative
impacts on others if implemented imprudently.
As defined by the proponents of the Model Act, wheeling involves the act
of "using the water supply facilities by someone other than the owner or
operator to transport water" for a fee.5 While perhaps an unglamorous topic,
wheeling in fact can play a critical role in facilitating more competitive behavior
on both the supply and demand side of the water market. On the supply side, a
wheeling policy can assure physical access to supplies made available by willing
sellers. On the demand side of the market, wheeling can create competition

5. Brian E. Gray, The Shape of Transfers to Come: A Model Water Transfer Act for California, 4
WEST-NORTHWEST 23 (1996).
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among buyers by allowing existing customers of water supply agencies to
acquire water supplies in a commodity market on their own.
However, if wheeling plays an important role in promoting competition, it
also poses enormously complicated challenges to assure that positive market
incentives do not result in negative impacts on those who choose not to
participate in a particular market transaction. To understand potential impacts
on nonparticipants, it is useful to distinguish between the physical and financial
aspects of a wheeling transaction.
Physically, wheeling is often essential to assure access to the existing
storage and transportation infrastructure for the delivery of market supplies to
purchasers. The voluntary market transaction itself creates a raw water supply.
Like any other supply source in the arid West, wheeling is required as a separate
service to transport the available commodity supply across both time and space.
However, the owners and other customers of the existing storage and
transportation system have typically invested vast amounts of financial resources
in these systems. These stakeholder interests will reasonably demand that a
wheeling policy fully protect the benefits they anticipated when investing in the
infrastructure, including access to low-cost supplies, reliability, and flexibility.
Financially, the establishment of wheeling charges requires the owners of
the existing infrastructure system to determine how much of the system's fixed
and variable costs should be recovered by those wheeling their own water, and
how much should be recovered by those receiving normal agency supplies. Since
the vast majority of costs for public agencies which operate water storage and
distribution systems are fixed and unavoidable, disputes among current owners
and would-be wheelers are likely. If wheeling charges do not recover an
appropriate amount for unavoidable costs, then these costs will have to be shifted
to the public agency's other members or customers who are not parties to the
transaction. These other members or customers will experience rising water rates
as a result of market transactions over which they have no control. By the same
token, if wheeling charges are unnecessarily high, desirable transactions could be
discouraged which would otherwise increase supplies available for use within the
service area of the public agency that adopts such charges.
During the past five years, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California (Metropolitan) has confronted the challenges of developing a sound
wheeling policy as it has received a variety of wheeling proposals ranging from
short-term transfers to replenish groundwater basins to a well-publicized longterm transfer from Imperial Irrigation District to the San Diego County Water
Authority. To deal with the challenges of an increasingly competitive
environment, Metropolitan and its member agencies created a mediated
negotiating process to make recommendations to Metropolitan's Board of
Directors regarding changes in Metropolitan's rate structure, including the
establishment of wheeling services and charges. At its November 1996 meeting,
Metropolitan's Board adopted a wheeling policy based on the report of the
mediated process. The overall goal of the policy is to provide access to
Metropolitan's system, thereby promoting competition in the water market,
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while fully protecting the financial and water supply of all of its member
agencies.6
The decision to establish such a policy is historic. Dating back to the 1952
Laguna Declaration, the policy of Metropolitan has been that the District shall
be the sole provider of supplemental water to its member agencies in Southern
California.7 The recently adopted wheeling policy reverses that trend,
recognizing the potential value of member agency market purchases as a source
of supply for the region.8
III.

Some Common Sense Wheeling Principles

To assure that market transactions do not have unnecessary negative
financial or water supply impacts on nonparticipants, wheeling policies should
embrace some common sense principles. To illustrate, this section describes
wheeling principles recently adopted by Metropolitan. While developed by
Metropolitan in cooperation with its member agencies, similar principles are
necessary in other parts of California to implement a balanced wheeling policy.
Equal Treatment. Perhaps the most fundamental wheeling principle is
that all water moving through the storage and transportation system, whether
normal supply deliveries or water being delivered under a wheeling agreement,
should be treated the same. This concept assures market participants that they
will enjoy a "level playing field" in the use of the storage and transportation
services being sought under a wheeling arrangement. Similarly, the equal

6. For a review of Metropolitan's wheeling policies, including Metropolitan's
wheeling principles, see Letter from Metropolitan General Manager to Metropolitan Board of
Directors, Letter # 8-10, Rate Refinement Process Phase 2 Wheeling Principles, Recommended Wheeling
Rates Effective January 15, `997, and Resolution Giving Notice of Intention to Adopt Wheeling Rates (Nov.
5, 1996) [hereinafter Metropolitan Letter] (on file with West-Northwest).
7. Metropolitan's Administrative Code § 4202 ("Laguna Declaration") states that
"[w]hen and as additional water resources are required to meet increasing needs for
domestic, industrial and municipal water, the District will be prepared to deliver such
supplies,"; and that, "[e]stablishment of overlapping and paralleling governmental
authorities and water distribution facilities to service Southern California areas would place
wasteful and unnecessary financial burden upon all of the people of California, and
particularly on the residents of Southern California." METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT ACT AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 4202 (on file with West-Northwest).
8. The development of water transfer programs at the member agency level is
consistent with the core strategy of Metropolitan's Integrated Water Resources Plan which
encourages development of water resources for the region at the member agency level.
Programs developed at the local level, including water conservation, water reclamation and
groundwater recovery programs are expected to develop approximately 800,000 acre-feet of
water for the region by the year 2000. See Gray, supra note 5.
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treatment principle assures existing customers that those seeking wheeling
services will share equally in the responsibility to pay for the storage and
transportation system.
No Financial Harm. A fundamental tenet of fairness is that
nonparticipants in a market transaction should not experience an increase in
their costs or water rates as a result of the implementation of a market
transaction. If this principle is violated, nonparticipants will have incentives to
oppose market transfers. As a practical matter, this principle requires that
wheeling charges must fully recover a fair share of all unavoidable costs
associated with the system through which wheeling is desired. By definition, if a
reasonable portion of such unavoidable costs are not recovered in the wheeling
charge, these costs must be shifted to others, thereby increasing the water rates
of third parties not involved in the market transaction.9
Reliability. Wheeling terms and conditions must be structured to deliver
water to the market participants in a manner that does not interfere with supply
deliveries that would otherwise be available to others as a result of their
investment in the existing system. This principle requires that the owner and the
existing customers be given the flexibility to operate the storage and
transportation system to accommodate future conditions. Virtually all water
supply systems vary greatly and unpredictably in their utilization, depending
upon hydrologic and other variable conditions, such as the demands of other
contractors entitled to water from a joint project. During wet conditions the
system may be fully utilized, for example, by carrying water for local
groundwater or surface reservoir storage. At other times, excess capacity may be
present. Requiring rigid rules guaranteeing delivery of transferred water,
regardless of future circumstances, could negatively impact the owners and the
other users of the system by denying them necessary discretion in the operation
of the system under changing circumstances.
Water Quality. The Metropolitan wheeling policy, in effect, requires a
nondegradation standard for market transactions. Adverse impacts on water

9. Metropolitan's wheeling rate is based on the premise that a member agency
purchasing water from Metropolitan at the "bundled" full service rate includes payment for the
fixed and unavoidable costs of the system, including transmission and storage, plus appropriate
variable costs. These costs represent approximately 85% of Metropolitan's costs. To develop
wheeling rates, Metropolitan in cooperation with its member agencies, "unbundled" its costs to
determine which costs should appropriately be recovered and which costs should not be
recovered. To avoid injury to other member agencies, wheeling rates should recover that portion
allocated to unavoidable costs on the same basis as member agencies purchasing Metropolitan
supplies. This approach to establishing wheeling rates is similar to that being implemented by
the California electric utility industry as part of AB 1890, signed by Governor Pete Wilson in
September, 1996, which allows for the recovery of unavoidable and stranded costs.
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quality can affect drinking water quality as well as impair water reclamation and
conjunctive use efforts. Because of the unanimous concerns of Metropolitan's
member agencies, wheeling transactions will not be allowed to degrade water
quality. Wheeling proponents would have the option to proceed with a transfer
if any adverse water quality impacts were mitigated to the satisfaction of the
party potentially harmed.
Water Management Programs. Finally, wheeling transactions should not
interfere with the financing or implementation of other water management
programs that are critical to the state or region. To accomplish this, and to be
consistent with the principle of equal treatment, the wheeling charge should
recover a proportionate share of the region's financial assistance to such
programs as wastewater reclamation and reuse, conservation, and groundwater
recovery. When Metropolitan's customers utilize the storage and distribution
system, the water rate they pay recovers a portion of the costs of such programs.
Such programs are beneficial to Metropolitan's customers because they are
designed to stretch the available capacity in the existing system and to help
reduce demands for imported water which promotes consensus on vital statewide
water issues. Because wheelers also enjoy the benefits of these programs, they
should pay a proportionate share of costs. Failure to do so would either
undermine the financial integrity of programs vital to regional and statewide
interests or unfairly shift the costs to other customers utilizing the system.
IV.

Wheeling Provisions of the Model Act

In an effort to promote more competition on the buyers' side of the emerging
water market, Section 804 of the Model Act expressly allows the members or
customers of a water supply agency to acquire transfer water from sources other than
the water supply agency. If such a transfer would require the use of the water supply
agency's storage and transportation facilities to deliver the purchased water, the water
supply agency must comply with the wheeling provisions of the Model Act.
In brief, the key wheeling provisions of the Model Act include the following:
Access. Section 901(a) of the Model Act requires a public water agency to
allow any legal users of water to use up to 70 percent of the unused capacity in
the water supply system of the agency to wheel transferred water. The Model Act
further provides that the entity seeking such wheeling shall be assured the right
to such capacity "throughout the term of the water transfer agreement."10
Prompt Action. Section 902(b) requires prompt determination by the
public agency, within 30 days of receipt of a written request for wheeling,

10. A MODEL WATER TRANSFER ACT
reprinted in 4 WEST-NORTHWEST 3 (1996).

FOR

CALIFORNIA [hereinafter MODEL ACT] § 901(a),
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regarding the availability of unused capacity and the terms and conditions for
wheeling water.11
Water Quality. Section 903(a) would permit the introduction of transfer
water to the system of a public agency that could significantly degrade the
quality of water delivered to the customers of the agency. The public agency
could prohibit or impose restrictions on the transaction only "if. . .the
transferred water would diminish the quality of the water in the system to an
extent that the blended water could not be treated for distribution to the public
agency's other members or customers, " or if reasonable terms and conditions
were required to assure that the water supply could comply with all applicable
water quality and environmental standards.12
Fair Reimbursement. Section 903(b) allows the public owner to impose
wheeling charges for the use of its system. These charges may recover capital,
operations and maintenance, and replacement costs only for the "portion of the
unused capacity made available by the agency for the transfer of water." In
addition, the agency may recover power, treatment and reasonable
administrative costs.13
Administrative Discretion. The Model Act affords little discretion to the
public agency in making decisions regarding whether and under what terms and
conditions to offer wheeling services. Section 904(a) requires that all disputes
regarding the agency's decisions be subject to binding arbitration. If the parties
to the dispute cannot agree on an arbitrator, Section 904(c) requires that a
single, neutral arbitrator be selected by the State Water Resources Control
Board. In all related proceedings, the public agency would bear the burden of
proof based on a preponderance of the evidence, and the decision of the
arbitrator would be final and beyond challenge by the public agency.14
V.

An Assessment of the Model Act Wheeling Provisions

Essentially, the common sense wheeling principles discussed in Section
III require that:
•
•
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Transferred water and normal deliveries using the same storage and
transportation system be treated equally;
Market transactions be structured to avoid adverse financial, water
supply, or water quality impacts on others; and

11.

Id. § 902(b).

12.

Id. § 903(a).

13.

Id. § 903(b).

14.

Id. § 904.
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Wheeling policy protect the financial integrity of water management
programs; such as reclamation and reuse and implementation of
urban water conservation Best Management Practices (BMPs).15

Consistent with these principles, current law regarding wheeling contains
an explicit provision that the "use of a water conveyance facility is to be made
without injuring any legal user of water . . . ."16 Similarly, the precedent-setting
water marketing provisions of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act
protect nonparticipants in the market by requiring that voluntary transfers result
in "no unreasonable impact on the water supply, operations, or financial
conditions of the transferor's contracting district or agency or its water users."17
In contrast, the proposed wheeling provisions of the Model Act include no
comparable provision. Indeed, an analysis of the possible impacts of the Model
Act's wheeling provisions indicates that, as currently proposed, they could result
in substantial negative impacts on others.
The Model Act requires that determinations of available unused capacity
be made on a system-wide basis, but that wheeling charges be assessed only
with respect to the portion of the system used to transport the water. This
approach is the reverse of the standard practices of water management agencies
and will result in unequal treatment of transferred water and normal deliveries.
The determination of unused capacity should be made on the basis of the
portion of the system physically required for wheeling. For example, consider an
agency with two distinguishable supply sources of equal capacity, one operating
at full capacity and the other operating at 50 percent capacity. It makes little
sense to require the owner of the overall system to wheel water through the fully
utilized portion of its system because, on average, the system has 25 percent
unused capacity. Such a policy would interfere with the operations of the agency
to the detriment of its other customers either through reduced availability of
water or increased costs.
The requirement in the Model Act that wheeling charges recover costs
only for the portion of the system used in the transaction will often require that
the public agency establish different pricing structures for the use of its storage
and transportation system depending on whether the water moving through the
system is a normal water delivery or transferred water. Such differences in
pricing are inconsistent with the "equal treatment" principle and may result in
significant financial inequities and in market signals that distort decisions to
purchase water in the emerging water market.
Like many other water agencies, Metropolitan recovers the fixed costs of
its storage and transportation system on a uniform basis regardless of where

15.

See CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCE, supra note 3.

16.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1810(d) (West 1996).

17. Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3405(a)(1)(K), 106
Stat. 4600 (1992).
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water is actually delivered in the system. Such a "postage stamp" rate reflects
the fact that the entire system is operated in an integrated manner to provide
blended water and reliability for all water users relying on the system. Because it
is virtually impossible to determine which specific costs are associated with
particular deliveries, the system is priced on a postage stamp basis for all
Metropolitan's normal deliveries.18 Under the "equal treatment" principle,
Metropolitan has proposed to treat wheeled water the same, charging a uniform
rate for wheeling on a postage stamp basis.19
The Model Act would apparently prohibit such an approach and require a
fundamentally different pricing structure for the use of the system for transferred
water as compared to normal deliveries. Depending upon the costs allocated to
different portions of the system and the specifics of a transfer proposal, the
approach of the Model Act could result in different costs (both higher or lower)
to use the system for transferred water than for normal deliveries. As a matter of
fairness, this approach may result in significant cost-shifting among water users
and will likely undermine the long-term sustainability of a marketing approach.20
No less importantly, by artificially shifting how the costs of the storage and
transportation system are recovered, the Model Act encourages price signals that
will distort market activities. Because the capital costs of the storage and
transportation system are fixed and unavoidable, pricing signals for their use should
not be allowed to distort activity in the commodity market for water. Yet the Model
Act would lead to different wheeling charges for different types of water marketing
transactions. Such differential wheeling charges have little benefit since wheeling
can occur only in unused (or excess) capacity, the costs of which are unavoidable.

18. An appropriate pricing structure for recovering fixed, unavoidable costs may vary
depending upon the physical characteristics of the storage and transportation system. For
example, the State Water Project (SWP) is a highly linear system where contractors further
downstream pay different fixed charges because it is relatively easy to identify an acceptable basis
for differential charges. Similarly, wheeling charges for noncontractors using the SWP system have
varied based on how much of the system was utilized to wheel water. In contrast, a system like
Metropolitan's is highly nonlinear with customers dispersed over 5,200 square miles of service
area and a uniform or "postage stamp" approach has been historically viewed as more equitable.
19. Under Metropolitan's recently adopted wheeling principles, the estimated price
for wheeling service for the 1996/97 fiscal year will be $262 per acre-foot. This charge will
allow recovery for all transmission costs and unavoidable storage and supply costs
associated with utilizing Metropolitan's facilities. The charge will be applied on a uniform
basis and is identical to the implicit charge for use of the system for Metropolitan's normal
deliveries. Metropolitan will investigate alternative means of recovering fixed costs in order
to reduce the incremental costs of wheeled water. See Metropolitan Letter, supra note 6.
20. An analysis of the impacts of cost-shifting if unavoidable costs are not included
in the wheeling rate shows that a 100,000 acre-feet transfer would result in a cost-shifting of
approximately $9 per acre-foot to nonparticipating member agencies of Metropolitan. See
Metropolitan Letter, supra note 6, at Exhibit B, Attachment 1, p. 16.
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However, differential wheeling charges can inappropriately influence market
decisions by encouraging transfers to occur where wheeling charges are artificially
lower, even if the economic and social costs of the water transfer may be higher in
this geographic region than in others. All of the above concerns can be remedied by
simply allowing the public agency to use the same pricing structure for use of the
system to wheel water and for normal water deliveries.
The water quality provisions in Section 903(b) of the Model Act allow for
substantial degradation of the quality of water delivered to other customers as
the direct result of wheeling transferred water.21 This could substantially
increase the costs of non-market participants in treating water to meet drinking
water standards and may impair the effectiveness of programs to reclaim and
reuse water and to promote conjunctive water management. Water quality
impacts are generally of equal or greater concern than reliability issues to local
water managers and the possibility of water marketing transactions degrading
water quality will be the source of substantial opposition to the evolving market.
The Model Act wheeling provisions could also undermine the financial viability
of water management programs that are of regional or statewide importance. To
promote reclamation and reuse of water, implementation of urban BMPs, and other
desirable programs, some agencies, including Metropolitan, include an assessment in
their water charges to subsidize these activities. Absent such financial assistance,
many of these programs would not be economically viable. Apparently, the intent of
the Model Act is to exclude such costs from recovery as a part of a wheeling charge.
Such an approach would either undermine the financial viability of desirable water
management programs or require that the costs of such programs be
disproportionately shifted to other members or customers as others continue to
develop alternative supplies free of these charges. As a result, the Model Act, in
attempting to promote water markets, could harm other equally important water
management programs. Once again, allowing for equal treatment so that all parties
using the system pay a proportionate share of the costs of these subsidies would
eliminate this potential problem.
Finally, the Model Act wheeling provisions substantially and unnecessarily
eliminate the discretion of existing public agency owners to operate their
systems for the benefit of their customers as a whole. In the past, water
marketing legislation has generated bitter disputes regarding the ability of
individual water users to sell water with minimal or no oversight exercised by
the local public agencies that developed the supply. Legislation introduced by
Assemblyman Richard Katz in 1992 (AB 2090) and subsequent efforts by
Assemblyman Dom Cortese in 1993 (AB 97) floundered amidst considerable
acrimony over the issue of user-initiated transfers, as market proponents sought
to eliminate the discretion of public agencies on the supply side of the market.
The Model Act prudently puts aside this contentious issue.

21.

MODEL ACT § 903(b).
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Unfortunately, the Model Act invites the same controversy on the demand
side of the market because the wheeling provisions attempt to eliminate the
discretion of agencies operating storage and transportation systems required to
deliver transferred water to buyers. In most cases, the existing customer of these
systems have invested enormous amounts, acting in good faith because they
believed that they would receive the benefits of such investments through the
flexible operations of the system to deliver affordable, high quality water. It is
appropriate for public policy to establish rules that require reasonable actions
to promote voluntary market activity on both the seller and buyer sides of the
market. However, attempts to eliminate the discretion of public agencies
regarding how this mandate is to be fulfilled will not likely be any more
successful on the buyer side through wheeling provisions than it was on the
seller side through efforts to force user initiated transfers.
VI.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The Model Act offers considerable promise for promoting an effective
water market as a key component in California's long-term water policy. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine resolving the major questions in the Bay-Delta
watershed as part of the CALFED process without addressing this
fundamentally important issue. However, the wheeling provisions of the Model
Act in their current form would likely raise more problems than they would
resolve. Accordingly, if the Model Act or other legislation progresses through the
California legislature, its sponsors and others involved in the debate should
consider substantive changes to the wheeling provisions. To assure the
development of water marketing policy and legislation in an effective manner
with maximum consensus support, the wheeling provisions should be amended
consistent with the following general recommendations. The Act should:
•

•

•
•

•
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Include assurances that public agencies have the option to adopt
"equal treatment" policies under which water moving through the
storage and transportation system is treated on an equal basis,
whether normal water deliveries or transferred water;
Maintain the "no harm" provision of existing law to assure that
wheeling does not adversely affect the finances, reliability, or water
quality of other members or customers of the system;
Expressly allow determinations of unused capacity on the basis of
the portion of the system required to deliver the transferred water;
Eliminate the existing provisions requiring binding arbitration and
imposing the burden of proof on the public agency based on
preponderance of the evidence; and
Allow public agencies reasonable discretion in the operation of their
systems so long as they implement policies consistent with the
principles identified above to wheel transferred water to those members
or customers who wish to purchase water from other sources.

